Liberia’s
Troubled Disarmament Process
By Nim’ne E. Mombo
The
Perspective
Atlanta, Georgia
January 20, 2004
The
Liberian disarmament program has been plagued by a number of unexpected
problems. By and large these problems
appear to have resulted from inadequate preparation and even possibly a lack of
the requisite expertise/experience.
Below is an outline of the relevant issues along with helpful
suggestions for corrective measures:
1.
UNMIL
asked pro- Taylor combatants to rendezvous at ELWA Junction from all over
Monrovia and its suburbs with their guns, but surprisingly with
no organized transport provided to enable the fighters to get there. Given their bitter experiences with armed
Liberian fighters, civilian drivers (commercial and private alike) generally refused,
for good reason, to allow the gun- toting combatants into their
vehicles. This basically meant that
many fighters had to walk from wherever they were to the ELWA Junction. Anyone reasonably familiar with the Liberian
situation knew or ought to have known that asking gun- toting Liberian
fighters gather in such a manner was unacceptably risky and dangerous. It is commonly known that Liberian fighters
of all stripes, whether pro- Taylor or anti- Taylor, are accustomed
to victimizing civilians whenever they have the slightest opportunity to do so.
They are just simply not accustomed to being so widely and so openly snubbed en
mass by civilians especially when the combatants are armed and drugged. It
therefore should not have come as any surprise to the authorities that the
combatants were generally disagreeable by the time they reached their ELWA
destination.
2.
To
make matters worse, the UNMIL transport facilities even at ELWA Junction for
getting the combatants from there to ultimate destination were, according to
news reports, so inadequate that “some fighters, including dozens of child soldiers, trudged
to Scheifflin on foot,” while the more brazen ones among them simply
“commandeered UN vehicles including a 12- seater bus to speed to the camp,
or smashed passing vehicles.” (See Liberian Fighters on Rampage After Gun
Cash Offer, by Alphonso Toweh, Reuters, Tuesday, December 9, 2003.).
3.
Then came the final
blow, the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. After all of the preceding, and having managed
somehow to reach Camp Scheifflin, whether on foot or otherwise, the fighters
were then told they would not be getting upfront US $300, as they had apparently
expected all along. Instead, they
would be paid $75 upon registration, with the balance of the US$300 to come
in two subsequent installments. Though unhappy about this unexpected development, many
combatants, according to news reports, did nonetheless hand in the guns they
had with them. However, “thousands
of others, unimpressed by the food rations, offers of psychological counseling
and a promised $300 stipend, left Scheifflin and returned to Monrovia to run
riot, the guns they had meant to leave behind blazing.” (Thousands of
ex-fighters register, disarm in Liberia, World - AFP, December
18, 2003). When these joined other soldiers who had not
yet reached Scheifflin and this other group “found out that a promised $300
would not be paid immediately, they went on the rampage.” (Liberian
Fighters on Rampage After Gun Cash Offer, by Alphonso Tower, Reuters,
Tuesday December 9, 2003). And
this sadly is how the rioting, looting and as well as the deaths of December
8 & 9, 2003 appeared to
have been sparked.
4.
According to news reports, the fighters insist they had not been told,
prior to arriving at Camp Scheifflin on December 8 2004 for disarmament, that they
would be paid in installments. They had therefore expected to be paid US$300
each on that day. UNMIL has not denied
that claim. Indeed, the UNMIL official who spoke to the press on this
issue “declined to be named” i.e., he/she spoke to
reporters on the issue only on condition of anonymity. (See Liberian
Fighters on Rampage After Gun Cash Offer, by Alphonso Tower,
Reuters, Tuesday December 9, 2003).
Avoidable Disasters
Sadly, the combined effects of these
errors were widespread indignation among combatants that eventually resulted
in 12 deaths (including two civilian deaths) and large- scale looting
in the Paynesville suburb of Monrovia. One of the civilians “was
shot point-blank eight times for refusing to hand over her car to fighters.”
The other was “felled by a stray bullet, one of thousands of rounds of automatic
weapons fired to strafe the city, sending panicked and war-weary residents
fleeing.” (See At Least 12 dead in Liberia riots against UN disarmament
program, AFP, Wednesday December 10, 2003). The other dead include “nine soldiers of the Armed Forced of Liberia
of former President Charles Taylor [who] were killed in overnight clashes
with UN peacekeepers” plus a tenth “fighter [who] was killed by UN peacekeepers
Tuesday afternoon as he was trying to steal a vehicle.” (Ibid). The UN has “acknowledged there had
been deaths in the rioting but refused to confirm that any were the result
of gun battles with …peacekeepers.” (Ibid, Supra).
No
doubt these horrific disasters, the deaths and the widespread looting (from
civilians who are already dispossessed and traumatized) could have been easily
avoided with better planning. One human life saved, one more needless death
avoided (even in Liberia, a country so now accustomed to the wanton destruction
of human lives) would have been well worth the modest cost and the little
investment of time that the requisite arrangements would have entailed.
Why Was the Process Suddenly Suspended?
Barely
one week after it began, the UN called a temporary halt to the disarmament
program claiming that both they and the “meager resources at…Camp [Scheifflin],
which had been equipped to register 400 fighter each day for a three- week
demobilization process” had been “severely overtaxed” very quickly. (Thousands of ex- fighters register,
disarm in Liberia, World-AFP, December 18, 2003). According to UNMIL’s chief Information officer,
Margaret Novicki, Camp Scheifflin, where pro- Taylor forces were scheduled
to be disarmed, “was meant for 1,000 combatants for the three- week
demobilization.” The Camp
“had been equipped to register 400 fighters each day
for a demobilization process to include psychological counseling and preliminary
vocational counseling” [All emphases supplied.] (Ibid, supra.)
With
that number of fighters being processed there each day, says Novicki, “there is
no way to service, feed and provide sanitation for 9,000 combatants in a camp
intended for 1,000 combatants.” (UN postpones Liberia disarmament campaign
after problem- filled first week, AFP, Monday, December 15,
2003). [All emphases supplied.] “We targeted 1,000 combatants at a
time. That is exactly the facilities we
have at Camp Scheifflin. But the Camp
now is overstretched,” Novicki told reporters. (“UN Gives Reasons For
Suspension of Disarmament in Liberia, But…” by I. Solo Kelgbeh, The
Inquirer, Posted to the Internet by The Perspective, Atlanta, George,
USA, December 17, 2003.)
Explanation Does Not Hold Water
The
explanation attributed to the UNMIL, per above, if indeed it is UNMIL’s
official explanation regarding the suspension of the disarmament process,
simply does not hold water for the following reasons:
a)
the demobilization process at this camp was scheduled to last three
weeks;
b)
the Camp “was meant for 1,000 combatants for the three- week
demobilization;
c)
the camp “had been equipped to register 400 fighters each day of [the]
process;”
d)
At that rate the Camp would have reached 1,200, and thereby already
exceeded its scheduled capacity, within the first three days of the disarmament
process.
Question:
So, what arrangements did UNMIL have in place to accommodate the rest of the
pro- Taylor forces for the remainder of the three- week disarmament
process? What plans did they make to
process more pro- Taylor fighters after the first three days? Or did they estimate government forces at
only 1,000? Hardly. The UN has estimated the number of fighters
to be disarmed at 40,000 to 45,000.[1] Pro- Taylor forces probably account for
more than a third of that number easily. So why did UNMIL limit its preparation
to readying facilities for just one thousand fighters, if that indeed is what
they really did?
As
with the $300 and the ELWA rendezvous situations, this looks, smells and sounds
suspiciously like another case of sheer failure to do the obvious, basic and
commonsense things - i.e., secure and prepare the requisite facilities and
provide skilled personnel in numbers sufficient to man the process. Be that as it may, one can only hope that
whatever the real explanation for this decision, adequate steps will now be
taken to ensure that the kind of needless disasters already experienced so
early in the disarmament process will not be repeated.
Bad Formula, Poor Results
Meanwhile,
there are other important disarmament- related problems to consider. The
first of these pertains to UNMIL’s guns- for- cash arrangement, which
basically works out to shelling out US $300 per combatant. The problem with
this procedure is that it places unbalanced emphasis on the combatants and not
enough emphasis on the guns in consideration of which they are to be paid this
amount. The payment plan, as currently structured, does not contain enough
incentives to encourage fighters to hand in all or even most of their guns. On the contrary, it will effectively
encourage them to hand in the barest minimum they can get away with, collect
$300 each and still keep a significant quantity of serviceable arms with which
they may subsequently commit armed robbery or otherwise further victimize the
civilian population at a later time.
Even worse, a number of them may well be able, under the current
structure, to collect $300, as “disarmed” combatants without actually
surrendering any weapons.
Soldiers Without Guns?
There
are already disturbing signs and suggestions that this trend may already be
underway. For example, per THE
INQUIRER, as reported on the Internet (December 9, 2003), government
fighters at Camp Scheifflin have “turned in to UNMIL several AK 47 riffles,
RPGs, M- 1s and G- 3s…most of which were rusty.”[2]
[Emphasis supplied.] As another example, per the WASHINGTON POST, “more
than 11,0000 Liberian fighters have given up their weapons including[3]
8,555 guns, since the start of a disarmament scheme meant to end 14 years of
war…”[4]
Eleven
thousand fighters but only 8,555 guns?
What happened to the other 2,445 guns?
The difference calculates to 22 percent (or nearly one quarter) of those
so far processed for disarmament. Were
there that many fighters without guns?
How could that have been? And if
so were these really bona fide fighters?
How about the possibility that a number of them may have registered more
than once under different names and/or at more than one location? Indeed, are there really any bona fide
fighters who do not have guns? Is it
not more likely that many fighters will have more than one gun each? These and
many other questions quickly come to mind regarding the current disarmament
process. It is important that adequate
steps are promptly taken to overcome these emerging difficulties.
Suggestions For An
Alternative Payout Formula
In
view of the preceding, and considering that some combatants have already been
paid $75, it would seem best to modify the current formula thus: $75 at
registration (as already done for some) plus an additional per- item
amount ($75 or $100 or such other amount as the authorities may consider
appropriate) for each serviceable weapon surrendered. Though doing so will definitely be quite tedious, it might be
useful to also consider similar per- item payments (e.g. 25 cents, 50
cents, $1, $2, etc.) for ammunition or sets of ammunition surrendered. To push the basic idea even further, it
might even help greatly to suitably classify the guns and their related
ammunition and then price them accordingly.
This way, members of a faction’s hierarchy can be paid a stipulated
amount for, say, each artillery piece, surrendered by his/her unit. I assume that the leadership of each faction
is likely to have much greater control over artillery units and other “big
guns” than they do over riffles and various small arms that are carried and
maintained by individual soldiers. Even
if for valid reasons the per- ammo payment and/or payment according the
class of weapon surrendered are not considered practicable, it would still be
best to pay
combatants on a per- gun basis in keeping with the format suggested
above.
What
is important is that the amount payable for each item should be sufficiently
attractive to encourage all fighters to surrender as many weapons and as much
ammunition as each can get hold of. Or
where applicable to provide actionable information that will lead to forcible
seizure of hidden weapons. This way,
those who surrender more guns and/or more ammunition, will get paid more than
those who either surrender just one gun (with or without ammo) or none at all.
A Well Publicized No-Questions- Asked Policy
Going
along with the preceding should be an official no- questions- asked
policy, which should also be very well publicized. Such a policy, taken along
with the cash- per- weapon formula will encourage some fighters/ex- fighters
not only to hand in their own weapons but additionally to bring all other
weapons and ammunition they can lay their hands on - even if they have to steal
them from others to do so. On this basis, those who might otherwise be tempted
to hold on to their guns will see reason to turn them in promptly, out of fear
that by keeping them they risk loosing the guns as well as the accompanying
cash benefit to others.
To
minimize the effects of any possible adverse reaction to a policy change in
line with this suggestion, it would be best to discuss and agree relevant
particulars with the Interim Government sufficiently in advance. Then UNMIL and the Liberian Government
should JOINTLY announce that following a detailed consideration of all
relevant factors, both have concluded that this is the most effective course of
action. It will help to strategically position peacekeepers prior to such an
announcement being made. The intent is to dissuade those who might otherwise be
so tempted, to refrain from any disruptive behavior. If properly handled in this manner, any adverse effects resulting
from such a change are likely to be minor and short- lived and therefore
need not be a matter of undue concern.
All in all, what matters most and should of greater concern to all is
that the program will be a great deal more effective. When that is done, the people of Liberia will have greater
confidence in UNMIL’s work and be that much more grateful to the peacekeepers
for it.
Rehabilitation of Ex- combatants
Getting
guns out the hands of combatants is without doubt an important aspect the
disarmament process. But that is only
one side of the equation for long- term peace. The other half requires that those disarmed be effectively
rehabilitated psychologically, adequately retrained with practical skills and
then properly reintegrated into normal society. Among other things, this will require qualified psychological
counselors, suitable facilities for practical skill training as well as trained
and experienced instructors to provide that training. It is doubtful that that the required facilities or trained
personnel are available or, even if these were already available, whether the
levels of skill training and the extent of psychological counseling required
can be properly provided to ex- combatants within the three weeks provided
for the rehabilitation/reintegration aspects of the current program. Therefore, this should be properly reviewed
and workable solutions put into effect.
The
rationale for these supplementary programs is that it is not enough to simply
take guns physically from the hands of fighters, particularly the child
soldiers among them. It is also just as important, perhaps even more important,
to psychologically wean them away from a mentality of violence (with or without
guns) as a way of life.
On the Probability
of Multiple Registrations
Unless
there is already in place an ironclad procedure to prevent them from doing so,
some fighters may well be able to register for disarmament in more at than one
place and/or under more than one name and thereby get paid a good deal more
money than they would otherwise be entitled to. Except for the money that would thereby be taken from other
important aspects of the disarmament program, this by itself would not be a
particularly serious issue provided those concerned do actually surrender
serviceable guns each time. However, as
already mentioned above, there are signs and suggestions that some combatants
are either handing in non- serviceable weapons and/or are “disarming”
without actually turning in any weapons.
If
this were to actually happen on a large scale, assuming it has not already
happened to that extent, it could vastly inflate and severely distort the
number of fighters disarmed (and correspondingly distort the cost of the
program) far beyond the level of actual disarmament. This may well undermine
the effective implementation of other aspects (e.g. skills training and psychological
counseling phases) of the broader disarmament program. Unless an effective procedure is promptly
put in place to prevent this before the program is resumed on January 20th
2004, it could well lead to and result in a colossal failure of the current disarmament
process. Outlined below is a suggestion
that could prove highly effective in dealing with that prospect. It involves a user- friendly high-tech
application that has already been effectively used in Liberia.
Use Existing Technology That Worked in Liberia
Before
leaving Liberia recently, I worked part- time at the Don Bosco Polytechnic.
Its main campus, located on Capital Hill, next door to the University
of Liberia, is what used to be St. Patrick’s High School. In the Library
there, we used an amazing computerized device that was donated to the School
by the Salasians of Don Bosco in the United Kingdom.
[5]
Its principal features are a digital camera
and an electronic fingerprint reader both of which are connected to a desktop
computer with appropriate software. To
be able to borrow a book from the library you must first register as a qualified
student. To do this you simply place
the print face of your thumb on the fingerprint reader, and face the camera.
The operator makes a click or two and both your face and your thumbprint are
promptly recorded. The operator then
inputs appropriate particulars about you - your name, age (date of birth,
if available), your address, college, etc.
Thereafter,
each time you go to checkout a book, or simply want to see how you stand with
the library, you again place your thumb on the device’s fingerprint reader and
presto your face is flashed on the computer screen along with the appropriate
particulars - your name, home address, etcetera as well as a history of your
library transactions, comprising a listing of books (title, author, publisher,
etc.) that you have previously checked out, when they were returned, if
returned, books you still have outstanding, if any, and overdue penalties, if
any, that may apply. This worked rather
well for the library at the Polytechnic in Monrovia. Perhaps, with suitable adaptations, it could also work well for
the disarmament program. Properly used,
it should, within certain limits, be foolproof in a particular location against
fraudulent attempts at multiple registrations.
Best To Check for A Multi- User Version
However,
the program I am familiar with was used on one computer at a single location
for every user of the system. Chances
are very good that, as is standard for most popular software, a multi- user
version is already available. In that
case, it should be even easier to suitably adopt that version for use in the
Liberian disarmament program. Otherwise, to be of maximum benefit in this case,
the system, should UNMIL decide on using anything similar to it, would have to
be suitably modified either for simultaneous use in multiple locations or
alternatively for procedures to promptly amalgamate databases from multiple
units in multiple and distant locations.
In that case it would be necessary to contact the designers of the
underlying software and agree suitable business arrangements with them for the
Liberian operation.
A Suitable Business Arrangement Required
If
approached on this matter and made a good enough business offer, say one
millions USD or so, the program developers are likely to be more than happy and
willing, even at very short notice, to suitably customize adaptations of their
application for use in the Liberian disarmament process. When making such an arrangement, it would
be best to also contract the program owners to staff its operation in
Liberia. Because their reputation
would clearly be on the line in this case, it will be in their business
interest to make sure that the system works properly and reliably. This will also eliminate or minimize the
risk of system failure, because others, who have reason to see it fail, might
seek to deliberately sabotage the system in order to make it look impractical
and unworkable in Liberia.
Also Useful for Voter Registration and Elections
If
the suggested adaptation proves successful, it is easy to see how, with or
without further changes, the modified program can then be additionally used for
voter registration and then again for actual voting, not only in Liberia but
wherever else there might be a need.
This would be killing three very important birds with the same
stone. Clearly it should be worth
considering. What is required is the willingness to do the right thing at the
right cost. Unless UNMIL already has in
place satisfactory mechanisms and procedures to adequately address the issue of
multiple and otherwise false registration of combatants, it would seem best
that they promptly take steps to acquire the system outlined above or a
satisfactory alternative. If necessary,
the restart date of the program should be suitably extended to enable such a
program to be properly put in place.
Suggestions
My
suggestions for dealing with the various problems facing the disarmament
program are already incorporated in the relevant preceding sections. They are summarized below:
1.
Reformulate
the payout scheme so that combatants are paid a base amount of $75 at
registration plus an additional sum ($75, $85, $100 or such other figure that
the authorities might consider appropriate) for each weapon surrendered. If considered appropriate and workable, pay
them similarly for ammunition surrendered.
Otherwise simply pay per gun and leave it at that. Then too, to thwart
the machinations of various warlords, consider an appropriate Cash- For- Information
program as a means of gaining prompt access to hidden weapons. Going along with these should be a well- publicized
no- questions- asked policy. It is best to suitably involve the
leadership of interim Liberian government in discussing, agreeing and
announcing the relevant changes.
2.
Identify
and select strategic locations to serve as rendezvous points, making sure that
combatants, when carrying guns, can readily reach them on foot from their
residences without having to trek long distances.
3.
On
rendezvous days, strategically position peacekeeping troops along and between
the routes to gathering sites. Also provide adequate transportation to pickup
combatants from rendezvous locations to disarmament sites. This way, Liberian
combatants, when carrying guns to rendezvous sites are not tempted, out of
habit, to victimize civilians.
4.
Ensure
to properly educate combatants and the general populace on important details
sufficiently in advance of event days, ensuring to employ communication media
(e.g. oft repeated radio announcements/dramas, handouts, etc.) that all,
regardless of age and education will clearly understand. It is particularly important to do this
whenever critical details such as payout formulas and their timing are changed for
any reason whatever.
5.
Make
adequate preparations to prevent multiple registrations. Consider possible
adaptation of the electronic fingerprint- reader system used at Don Bosco
Polytechnic. If considered useful, make
appropriate business arrangements with owners of the system. Then additionally consider applying the
adopted system to voter registration and elections. If need be, consider rescheduling the restart date of the
disarmament process.
6. Ensure adequate skills training and psychological rehabilitation for all ex- combatants. This, if successfully done, will make them less likely to see and wand to use violence (with or with guns) as their means of livelihood.